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Introduction 
Entrepreneurs may wish to be selective about which relatives to 
include or exclude in their businesses. For example, their child might 
be inept but their niece might be outstanding. What aspects of kinship 
systems affect their ability to makes these sorts of choices? What 
enables them to bend their ties of kinship and marriage to the 
interests of their business? Most broadly, what dimensions of kinship 
lend themselves to tactical or instrumental actions?  This question is 
sweeping just as my meaning of “entrepreneurs” is very broad: those 
who take actions with the goal of growing their capital (Stewart, 
1991). This capital may take the form of newly started ventures, 
dynastic firms, or even in pre-capitalist systems other social forms, for 
example, rural estates farmed by followers. 
An adequate answer for such a question would require large-
scale comparative analysis. However, the question is promising 
enough, and neglected enough, to justify an exploratory effort. To do 
so I identify properties of kinship systems that affect the ability of 
entrepreneurs to take tactical actions and use discretion in their use or 
avoidance of kinship ties. Seven propositions are suggested. These 
refer to (1) incorporation of talent regardless of sex roles, (2) non-
relatives treated as kin, (3) widening the vertical range of kinship, (4) 
                                                          
i A much earlier version of this paper was included in a presentation at the University of Alberta, 
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widening the collateral range of kinship, (5) incorporation of relatives 
through marriage, (6) re-defining kinship ties and obligations, and (7) 
selective exclusion. 
KINSHIP SYSTEMS AND DISCRETION FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS 
Variations in Kinship Systems 
Entrepreneurs mobilize resources accessed through networks of 
kinship and marriage. These resources include people (as partners or 
employees), capital, information, and reputational affirmation (Aldrich 
& Cliff, 2003; Grassby, 2001: 235, 285-286; Stewart, 2003). Just as 
with other sources of resources, entrepreneurs will prefer to have 
options as they choose to work or not work with kin. For example, 
restriction to the closest kin could be undesirable because they might 
not be willing or able (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Gilding, 2005; Grassby, 
2001: 229, 408-412; Pérez- González, 2006; Sciascia & Mazzola, 
2008; Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Not surprisingly, then, kinship 
patterns in family firms are often found to be “fluid” and norms to be 
adaptable (Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 31, 216; Oxfeld, 1993: 166). As 
Hamabata (1990: 34) found amongst elite Japanese business families, 
“in actual practice… much of the [kinship] ideal is routinely ignored” 
(see also Kondo, 1990: 162- 166 for modest Japanese business 
families). 
Entrepreneurs are not unique in their “tactical” uses of kinship 
(Bloch, 1971). Contrary to stereotypes of “traditional”, “kin-based” 
societies, kinship systems generally are amenable to choice and to 
“achievement” rather than “ascription” (Finnegan, 1970); Fortes, 
1969: 219-220. This is true in North West Europe and the New World 
(Robertson, 1991: 110, 112, 120). This is also true in so-called 
“primitive” or “kin- based” societies, some of which – the “Bigman” 
cultures of highland New Guinea – are notorious for self-interested 
maneuvering (Stewart, 1990; Strathern, 1971; Zimmer- Tamakoshi, 
2001; for an Amazonian example: Killick, 2009; for !Kung bushmen: 
Robertson, 1991: 28; for Swat Pathans, Barth, 1959). Even for sub-
Saharan Africa, the home of apparently rigid, unilineal descent 
systems (Barnes, 1962), we find detailed ethnographies of kinship 
strategizing (towards village leadership: Gulliver, 1971; Turner, 1957; 
van Velsen, 1964). Two of the strongest arguments for choice within 
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kinship systems are also based on African cases (Finnegan, 1970; 
Wallman, 1975). 
That being said, kinship systems vary in their accommodation of 
choice, their “optative” character (Finnegan, 1970) and potential for 
entrepreneurial manipulations. Mattesich and Hill (1976: 151, 153) 
suggested that “certain properties of societies [determine whether] 
kinship has negative, neutral, or positive effects upon business 
organization.” For example, Schweitzer (2000a) argued that “kinship 
systems” tend towards one pole – inclusive – or the other – exclusive. 
Following Schweitzer (2000a: 208), “inclusive refers to a given kinship 
system whose functional characteristic is to maximize the number of 
individuals who can be ‘made into relatives,’ if strategically 
advantageous.”  “Exclusive” then refers to the reverse. 
To my knowledge there is no comprehensive overview, either 
conceptual or empirical, of the qualities of kinship systems that 
generate opportunities for entrepreneurial discretion. One possible 
approach would be to adopt broad-brush typologies such as 
Schweitzer’s. For example, we could hypothesize that entrepreneurs 
will profit more from kinship ties in “inclusive” kinship systems. A 
counter hypothesis would be that they also need methods to exclude 
non-contributing kin. This approach has three problems.  First, broad 
brush treatments of kinship systems can be highly misleading, as the 
efforts to characterize certain cultures as “patrilineal”, for example, 
have shown; such labels mischaracterize the complex patterns of 
transmission of property and office (Gough, 1971; Holy, 1996: 75; 
Scheffler, 2001: xii, 22, 78, 82, 87, 89). Second, an approach based 
on comparing kinship systems could not offer prescriptive advice 
because entrepreneurs would not be willing or able to switch kinship 
systems. To provide prescriptions, or simply to sensitize entrepreneurs 
to their options, we would need to consider the possible tactics that 
might or might not be available. Third, in order to classify kinship 
systems in broad terms we would need a rubric based on these specific 
tactics in the first event. Therefore I try to think “in terms of logical 
possibilities” (Needham, 1971: 10) to generate propositions about 
kinship and discretion. The first five propositions assume that kinship 
is a resource and refer to increasing the range of ties, that is, 
inclusiveness. The last two propositions do not assume that kinship is 
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a resource and refer to methods for re-defining or excluding kinship 
ties. 
Equal Opportunities Irrespective of Sex Roles 
Cultures differ in their value placed on equal opportunities in 
business for females; that is, for those who play female sex roles as 
culturally conceived. Examples of cultures in which male roles are 
strongly advantaged are all too easy to find (e.g., Dhaliwal, 1998; 
Douglass, 1992; Greenhalgh, 1994; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987; 
Song, 1999: 110-111). Even in the “modern” West, where norms of 
sex role equality prevail (at least with respect to inheritance, Finch & 
Mason, 2000), actual practice still advantages males (at least with 
respect to succession) (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Substituting 
daughters for absent or incapable sons has been noted as one of the 
“strategies of heirship” (Goody, 1976: 92), but implicit in this 
formulation is a widespread bias in favor of sons. 
Self-evidently, firms that equally incorporate females in both 
ownership and management thereby increase, and possibly double, 
their access to talent. Less evidently, they thereby increase the scope 
of their perceptions and network connections (Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 
202, 227; Hamabata, 1990: 28; Lomnitz &Pérez-Lizaur, 1987: 118; 
Robertson, 1991: 41). A similar logic applies to non-discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation (Levine, 2008). Research about gay and 
lesbian entrepreneurship is still seminal, but undoubtedly some 
enterprising family firms have found use for this tactic (Schindehutte, 
Morris, & Allen, 2005; Willsdon, 2005). 
Proposition 1. Entrepreneurial options are increased by non-
discrimination on the basis of sex roles. 
1a. Proposition 1 holds only to the extent that females receive 
equal opportunities to be prepared for ownership and for advancement 
into management. 
1b. Entrepreneurial options are increased by non-discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. 
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Kin-Like Ties 
Informal relatedness  
Entrepreneurs have even more discretion if they can create their 
own kin-like ties. Opportunities vary across cultures, in both so-called 
“primitive” cultures as well as so-called “advanced.”  In some cultures, 
connections based on territory, age, or “association membership” are 
just as important as those based on kinship (Finnegan, 1970: 178). 
They were important in the development of capitalism in the English-
speaking world (Grassby 2001: 263).  They are important in Italian 
industry clusters (Blim, 1990: 154). Quite possibly anthropologists 
have overstated the importance of formally recognized kinship to the 
neglect of more informal forms of “relatedness.” (On preference for 
this term of Janet Carsten’s, rather than “fictive kin,” see Smith, 2009: 
7; compare Holy, 1996: 166-168; Howell 2009: 154-155.) 
 Well-known and wide-spread examples of quasi-kinship are 
forms of godparenthood and ritual parenthood, which can extend to 
competition to nurture children more than do the “real” parents 
(Douglass, 1992: 22; Goody, 1976: 66; Holy, 1996: 166; Mayer, 
2009; Zimmer-Tamakoshi, 2001: 190).  Another example of these 
more “fluid, creative, and incorporative systems” in the context of a 
seemingly lineage- based society (China) is found in Stafford’s (2000) 
study of the cycles of yang (related to filial piety or xiao) and of 
laiwang, which “centers mostly on relationships between friends, 
neighbors and acquaintances” (p. 38). Bruun (1993: 52 59) found that 
15-20% of the Chinese family business households he studied had 
incorporated distant kin or non- kin into their families. 
Adoption and fosterage  
Adoption and fosterage of children are distinct among these 
practices because they can be means of acquiring an heir and 
successor. These practices are highly varied in incidence across 
societies, more common in China and India than in Europe (Goody, 
1976: 76; 1996: 155; Howell, 2009).  Both have been used as means 
of recruiting talent to family firms (Andersson, 2001; Davidoff & Hall, 
1987: 223; Goody, 196: 145; Song, 1999: 12). Business families 
might not only take in foster children but also send children away for 
some years to learn a trade elsewhere (Grassby, 2001: 183; 234; 
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281-282). Unfortunate consequences are not unknown. For example, 
Oxfeld (1993: 199) reports on the practice (“generally frowned on by 
the community” but nonetheless observed) of disinheriting adopted 
sons when the mothers bore sons later on. Further, children 
themselves might bear emotional costs (Creed, 2000; Mayer, 2009; 
Notermans, 2008). This may be especially true in cases where “foster-
kinship… [is] clientalism [that is, a “mechanism for tributary control”] 
dressed in the plumage of kinship” (Parkes, 2004: 606, 607). Finally, 
cultures vary in their willingness to incorporate children born out of 
wedlock into the family. (For an example of relative inclusion 
commingled with discrimination, see Douglass, 1992). 
Proposition 2. Entrepreneurial choice is increased by the 
strategic use of kin-like forms of relatedness. 
2a This is rendered more possible to the extent that adoption 
and fosterage are options. 
Widening the Vertical Range of Kin 
Polygyny 
Entrepreneurs’ choices can be limited by their available 
offspring. Perhaps they have no children or the children they have are 
incapable or uninterested in their business.  The entrepreneur requires 
a “strategy of heirship” (Goody, 1976). Adoption is one example, of 
the type that adds children directly. The other main type adds mothers 
(Goody, 1976: 90-95). Historically the common example is polygyny. 
(Polygyny is not a unitary phenomenon, but for simplicity I ignore sub-
types and include for current purposes both concubinage and polycoity 
(e.g. handmaidens) (Goody, 1976: 17, 42, 90; White, 1988: 549-
553).) The clear benefit of this tactic is that it increases the offspring 
(of a male) and it is in some countries “an economically viable 
production system” (White, 1988: 557; also Goody, 1976: 51). The 
logical inverse of polyandry is extremely rare and it increases the 
offspring of the wife only if one husband is infertile (Goody, 1976: 17; 
Holy, 1996: 62-63). Rather than polyandry, the practice of woman- 
woman marriage for purposes of jural rights to the offspring – found 
amongst the Nuer – is the female equivalent of polygyny with respect 
to heirship (Gough, 1971: 107). 
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Polygyny is not for all occasions or cultures. As Robertson 
(1991: 58) puts the point, “polygyny may be a smart strategy for 
marshalling labour, but it is not a sensible means of consolidating a 
narrow interest in property in the longer term.” Moreover, it generates 
not only children but also family problems such as domestic conflicts 
and mistreatment of and resistance from women (Al-Kremawi & 
Graham, 1999; Bove & Valeggia, 2009; Goody, 1976: 51-57; Jad, 
2009; Jankowiak, Sudakov, & Wilreker, 2005). Sustaining a 
polygynous system, given normal demographics, also requires 
frequent divorce and late marriage by males and early marriage by 
females (Holy 1996: 63-65). Of course it is also not a legal option in 
every country; a point that reinforces the differences found amongst 
kinship systems. 
Re-marriage 
From the perspective of a male seeking to increase the number 
of mothers of his children, another strategy of heirship is re-marriage 
or serial monogamy (Goody, 1976: 42, 91). This strategy, which is 
frequently observed in the highly optative kinship systems studied by 
Gulliver (1971), Turner (1957) and van Velsen (1964), can increase 
the number of children and bring step-children besides. For women 
especially, re-marriage can also help to overcome the financial 
burdens of divorce (Dewilde & Uunk, 2008; Ozawa & Yoon, 2001). It 
adds greater complexity and options because it leads to “extensive 
kindreds” and potentially to “the sense of a controlled expansion of 
relationship possibilities and permutations” (Simpson, 1994: 832, 
846). 
Such an upside applies to the entrepreneurially oriented actor, 
particularly one with the resources and time to invest in the more 
complex kindred. It might not apply otherwise (Simpson, 1994). 
Moreover, this strategy has its costs, aside from presumed emotional 
distress at least at some times.  Children often lose touch with half 
siblings, and parents – fathers especially - often lose connection with 
and support from their children (Kalmijn, 2007; Simpson, 1994; van 
Velsen, 1964: 107). According to a meta- analysis by Jeynes (2006), 
the psychological well-being of children following parental re- marriage 
is diminished. Moreover, as fairy tales and social science both tell us, 
parents tend to be biased towards their own offspring at the expense 
of step-children (Akashi- Ronquest, 2009; Simpson, 1994). On 
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balance, then, re-marriages introduce conflicts “between the children 
of the first and second alliance [but they also] widen contacts and 
increase resources” (Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 202; also 215, 221). 
New reproductive technologies 
Another tactic for generating offspring is the use of the new 
reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization. As with 
polygyny, this tactic is differentially available, partly for economic and 
partly for normative reasons. Where it is available it is adapted to its 
particular cultural context. For example, it is used very differently in 
the socially conservative culture of Lebanon (Clarke, 2008) than in the 
socially liberal cultures of urban China and India (Gates, 1993; 
Khanna, Sudha, & Rajan, 2009; see generally Levine, 2008). We can 
expect that it will become an increasingly utilized strategy of heirship. 
Proposition 3. Entrepreneurial choice is increased by tactics that 
increase the inter- generational range of kinship ties. 
3a This is made more possible to the extent that polygyny and 
informal marriages are options. As a corollary, this is made more 
possible to the extent that the incorporation of children born out of 
wedlock is an option. 
3b This is made more possible to the extent that serial 
monogamy with re-marriage is an option. 
3c This is made more possible to the extent that the new 
reproductive technologies are options. 
Widening the Horizontal Range of Kin 
Bilateral kinship  
Kinship can also be expanded in the ancestral direction.  If one 
recognizes a founding or apical ancestor a generation further into the 
past more of the descendants are recognized as kin (Steadman, 
Palmer & Tilley, 1996).  That is, the method refers to vertical (cross-
generational) kinship but the effect is horizontal; increasing 
generational depth increases the collateral range of kin. Another 
approach that increases the horizontal range and, in practice, is 
associated with choice of connections is reckoning kinship through 
both the mother’s and father’s sides; that is, the use of bilateral 
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kinship, or in descent terms, cognatic descent. To Westerners this 
seems obvious because they are used to non-unilineal, non-ancestor 
centered kinship (Finch & Mason, 2000: 163). Also obvious to 
contemporary Westerners but scarcely universal is flexibility in choice 
of residence. Such choice can also be found in some pre-capitalist 
systems (Harrell, 1997: 432-434; Holy, 1996: 111-118; Turner, 1957: 
61-64; van Velsen, 1964: 65, 73, 229). 
With bilateral reckoning, individuals face multiple overlapping 
memberships that lack stable kinship groupings (Harrell, 1996: 212; 
Holy, 1996: 42, 116-117). This can result in rivalries over loyalties on 
the part of grandparents (Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987: 132-134) and 
greater complexity, as different “descent modes [are often used] for 
differently for different purposes” (Barnes, 2006: 337; also Bloch & 
Sperber, 2002; cf. Gough, 1971). By the same token it provides a 
wider safety net within which entrepreneurs can take risks 
(Greenhalgh, 1989; Mattesich & Hill, 1976) and generates greater 
choice and a wider range of options (Grassby, 2001: 263; van Velsen, 
1964: 75). For example, de Lima (2000) reports that elite Portuguese 
family members could choose their mother’s or father’s surname, 
depending on which was more prestigious (also Holy, 1996: 119). 
The “work of kinship”  
Capitalizing on these wider options may call for women’s “work 
of kinship,” as di Leonardo (1987) called it. By this she meant “the 
conception, maintenance, and ritual celebration of cross-household 
kinship ties,… the creation and maintenance of quasi-kin relations 
[and] decisions to neglect or to intensify particular ties” (1987: 442-
443; also Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 202, 227; Lomnitz & Pérez- Lizaur, 
1987: 118). In di Leonardo’s view (1987: 443) this work requires “an 
adult woman in the household” (also Kalmijn, 2007). This work could 
be useful in any system but particularly so in bilateral kinship systems 
because their combination of complexity and informality offers more 
potential for creative enactment. 
Diverging devolution  
“Diverging devolution” is Goody’s (1976: 6) term for bilateral 
inheritance; the opposite, such that “the intergenerational devolution 
of valuables” follows only one line of the sexes, is “homogenous” 
(Hann, 2008: 146). We have noted that this is prescribed in the 
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modern West (Finch & Mason, 2000) but this is a recent development 
whereas bilateral kinship is not. One might suspect that if bilateral 
inheritance offers more options than does homogenous inheritance, 
then it follows that partible rather than impartible inheritance (though 
a murky distinction; Hann, 2008: 151) does also. 
Proposition 4. Entrepreneurial choice is increased by bilateral 
kinship and cognatic rather than unilineal descent. 
4a This is made more possible to the extent that choices of 
household residence are possible. 
4b This is made more possible to the extent that the “work of 
kinship” is carried out, often by women. 
4c This is made more possible to the extent that bilateral 
inheritance (diverging devolution) is possible. 
Increasing Options by Means of Ties through Marriage 
Ties through marriage – that is, affinity – increase the range of 
ties and offer greater strategic discretion than do consanguineal ties 
alone. The incorporation of in- laws is highly useful, where possible, 
not only in developing successors but also in developing alliances 
between business families (Barth, 1959: 40; Gates, 1996; Holy, 1996: 
160-162; Leyton, 1970; Wong, 1988: 31). For this purpose polygyny 
has the advantage of enabling a wider range of alliances (Turner, 
1957: 281). Alliances provide not only mutually advantageous 
transactions but also information benefits through increased network 
range and heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is a variable in the kinship 
networks of family firms. In one study (Renzulli, Aldrich, & Moody, 
2000), kinship networks tended to provide relatively redundant 
information for entrepreneurs.  In another study (Anderson, Jack, & 
Drakopoulou, 2005) the opposite obtained. Strategic marital ties 
increase the heterogeneity of kinship networks, provided that 
marriages include outsiders; that they are, loosely speaking, 
exogamous rather than endogamous. 
Marriage is also a way to incorporate a wider range of talent into 
the firm (Grassby, 2001: 413; Leyton, 1970: 180). For example, the 
“appointed daughter” in Hindu India married with the intention of 
producing an heir not for her husband but her father (Goody, 1976: 
73, 81). By contrast, Japanese “merchant families… celebrated the 
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birth of a daughter because it enabled them to recruit and train a 
capable man through marriage to the daughter” (Saito, 2008: 6). 
Hamabata (1990: 43-45) observed an elite Japanese business family 
contemplating this tactic. In this case the daughter objected as she did 
not wish to become, in effect, a household (ie) head.  In the cases 
studied by Saito, this tactic could also lead to conflict due to “dual 
power between [the son-in-law] and the founding family” (Saito, 
2008: 18). Not surprisingly, marriage in these cultures has often been 
arranged. Another variant of affinal recruitment that is more feasible in 
some cultures than others is incorporation of affines from gay and 
lesbian unions (Barnes, 2006). 
Proposition 5. Entrepreneurial choice is increased by the use of 
affinal, not just consanguineal ties. 
5a. This is made more possible to the extent that marriages are 
made with the strategic interests of the families in mind. 
5b. This is made more possible to the extent that affines may be 
incorporated as members of the kin group. 
5c. This is made more possible to the extent that partners from 
gay and lesbian unions may be incorporated as members of the kin 
group. 
Redefining Kinship Ties and Obligations 
Widening the range of kin (propositions 1-5) is insufficient 
because some relatives are unhelpful or worse (Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 
217; Grassby, 2001: 229-232; Wallman, 1975). While it might not be 
harmful, and even helpful in the interests of domestic harmony, to be 
inclusive in the distribution of wealth, it could certainly be harmful in 
the distribution of executive positions. Following Schweitzer’s (2000a: 
208) terminology, then, both small and major family firms may tend to 
be inclusive regarding property but exclusive regarding office (Marcus 
& Hall, 1992: 27; Oxfeld, 1993: 165). 
Manipulating membership 
Entrepreneurs prefer a situational logic (Wallman, 1975) when 
deciding whether to invoke kinship ties, and if invoked, in deciding 
which people they count as kin.  Two of the most widely noted means 
for excluding are selective memory and acknowledgement 
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(“genealogical amnesia”) and renegotiation of kinship ties (for quote: 
van Velsen, 1964: 47, also 268; Barnes, 1962; Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 
32; Gulliver, 1971: 236; Holy 1996: 119). Some cultures have 
institutionalized methods of “ancestral gerrymandering”, such as 
Zimmer-Tamakoshi (2001) found among the Gende of New Guinea. 
Even written genealogies have had little effect in damping these 
rewritings of ties (Lewis, 1996); in fact, charters can also be re-written 
(Barth, 1959: 25; Scheffler, 2001: 40). 
Another approach to “pruning the family tree,” as Lambrecht 
and Lievens (2005) put it, is to define the founder in the immediate 
past, most conveniently as one’s own parent (Choi, 1995).  As Holy 
notes (1996: 117), even in cognatic systems “groups [based on 
kinship] do form” as if in unilineal systems, based on the selective 
choice of a particular apical ancestor – a firm founder, for example. Of 
course, such redefinitions do not go uncontested; Choi (1995) offers a 
good case study. Moreover, most “prunings” require a negotiated buy-
out of various kin, a process that does lead to simpler structures (as 
Lambrecht and Lievens noted) but often to considerable acrimony as 
well (which they did not). 
Dis-embedding and re-embedding   
Entrepreneurs may not only wish to redefine not only the 
boundaries of their kindred, but also the normative expectations of 
behavior towards particular kin. Early in an entrepreneur’s career, she 
may face kinship obligations that conflict with the growth of her 
venture. This conundrum is found wherever kinship implies a moral 
obligation to kin, which is to say everywhere (Grassby, 2001: 230, 
298; Hart, 1975; Stewart, 1990). What is fortunately not so ubiquitous 
is the success of the pull of these obligations in opposition to economic 
success. A vernacular expression for this problem in Caribbean 
cultures is “crab antics” (Wilson, 1973: 58). The analogy with crabs is 
based on their behavior, when placed in a bucket, of pulling back down 
any who begin to escape (also Douglass, 1992: 263; Quinlan, 2006; 
Trevinyo- Rodríguez, 2010). 
In order for entrepreneurs to make choices that balance their 
kin and business obligations, they must follow a career that begins 
with the option of deciding who deserves support, and what resources 
must be invested in their ventures. They must engage in at least some 
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measure of dis-embedding from the norms of generalized reciprocity 
and sharing with kin (Hart, 1975; Holy, 1996: 110; Turner, 1957: 
133). Excellent examples of dis-embedding are found in Hart (1975) 
and more colorfully yet in Turner (1957). Turner recounts the 
opportunistic use of suboptimal kinship ties by the ambitious but 
infertile Sandombu, who built up a successful farm based on an initial 
recruitment of “three generations of matrilineal kinswomen… one of 
them… a witch, another a prostitute, and the third a child in arms.  In 
allowing [these three] to reside at his farm Sandombu was openly 
defying the people of [the village]” (Turner, 1957: 153; also 230-231). 
Some cultures have greater understandings of the need to dis-
embed, and also of the need later in the entrepreneurial career to re-
embed in culturally approved ways. Mechanisms of dis-embedding 
may be as simple as opportunities for geographic distancing and as 
complex as trusts and other legal devices.  Mechanisms of re- 
embedding permit the successful entrepreneurs to convert their wealth 
into social standing by such means as the adoption of landed gentry 
lifestyles, volunteer public service and philanthropy (Barth, 1959: 77-
80; Hart, 1975; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987: 13; Marcus & Hall, 
1992: 110-112; Stewart, 1990; 2003). 
Proposition 6. Entrepreneurial choice is increased by 
opportunities to manipulate and redefine membership in the kindred. 
6a. This is made more possible to the extent that there is 
cultural recognition of the need for adaptations in the normative 
expectations of reciprocity over the entrepreneurial career. 
Selective Exclusion 
Not surprisingly, large dynastic family firms tend to be the most 
exclusive in Schweitzer’s sense. In fact, in the Portuguese cases 
studied by de Lima (2000), and the American cases studied by Marcus 
and Hall (1992) not all family members possess shares in the 
business, let alone control the top management team, despite legal 
regimes that tend to treat kinship ties as necessary and sufficient for 
access to family wealth. This is to be expected, for as Schweitzer 
(2000b: 21) argues, “‘exclusion’ is a function of kinship relations in 
contexts where they regulate access to limited resources” (see also 
Harrell, 1997: 34, 272-276; Holy, 1996: 107-108 regarding 
inheritance; Schweitzer, 2000a: 208-210). 
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Exclusionary tactics  
Some exclusionary tactics are indirect. Examples include 
selective memory and ancestral gerrymandering (above) and hiring 
from the labor market or other “spheres of exchange” (Barth, 1967) 
and other means of ignoring kinship altogether (Hann, 2008). As 
Needham (1971) implies and Wallman (1975) asserts, the functions 
that may be performed by kinship can also be performed by other 
means. More direct tactics include refusing to promote a child as 
successor and attempting to dismiss a family member. These methods 
can be emotionally costly, and culturally and politically complex (for 
the first example, Hamabata, 1990: 43; for the second Learned, 1995, 
for his efforts to remove his father from his board of directors). 
Therefore, those who are excluded may be compensated with 
moveable property or with the launch of new ventures for their benefit 
(Goody, 1996: 143, 155, 203; Oxfeld, 1993: 181). 
Other exclusionary tactics are more draconian, such as 
“whispered slander”, accusations of sorcery or the threat of same 
(Turner, 1957: 103), banishment and “obligatory sojourning” (Gates, 
1996: 4) and disinheritance (for Japan, Whyte, 1996). Other tactics 
are repugnant: sati (widow burning) and infanticide (Bakan, 1971; 
Fisch, 2005; Gates, as above; Goody, 1976: 95-96; Spinelli, 2005). All 
of these tactics, where they occur, are “deeply embedded in and 
responsive to the societies in which [they] occur” (Spinelli, 2005: 17). 
The entrepreneur’s options depend not only on the repertoire of 
feasible tactics but also the cultural and personal costs, if any, to be 
paid for their use. 
Affiliation to Kin-Based Groups 
de Lima (2000) found that in large Portuguese family firms the 
route to the top required experience in the firm, high levels of training, 
proven competence, and the backing of one’s own powerful branch of 
the family.  It was also advantageous to be an eldest male. Under 
certain circumstances the TMT might be open to long-tenured non- 
kin. However, the norm was patrifiliation (being an offspring on the 
father’s side) as the “necessary but not sufficient” condition for 
affiliation to the status. Scheffler (2001) has elaborated on the 
theoretical and ethnographic consequences of this sort of logic. He did 
not develop his arguments in the context of studying family firms, with 
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the exception of Asian joint family firms (personal communication). 
Therefore we will use his concepts by analogy from kinship groups to 
family firms. 
Scheffler proposed three possible constitutive rules: filiation is a 
necessary and sufficient condition, a necessary but not sufficient 
condition, or the sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
acquisition of a kinship status. For economy, I will refer to these as the 
N&S, N and S rules. To illustrate the principles, we could say that for 
dynastic firms, whether in Portugal, China or the United States, access 
to wealth generally follows the N&S rule whereas access to the TMT 
follows the N rule. The latter rule is more stringent as more conditions 
than mere filiation must be met (de Lima, 2000; Greenhalgh, 1994; 
Marcus & Hall, 1992: 27; Whyte, 1996). 
The ability of the family firm to choose other criteria than 
kinship for affiliation into the TMT does not require it to choose 
economically rational criteria. Even in the N case, rewards and 
promotions in family firms need not be meritocratic (Dhaliwal, 1998; 
Douglass, 1992: 263). Practices of exclusion in high status families 
may have no bearing on business capability. For example, Lomnitz & 
Pérez-Lizaur, (1987: 112, 120) discuss the use of familial ideology in 
boundary maintenance by elite Mexican “grandfamilies”. These 
ideologies in fact reject modern business practice.  They are 
interesting for their use of negative moral examples, that is, the role of 
black sheep (pp. 9-10; see also Long, 1979 and compare Panoff, 1985 
and Strathern, 1971: 84-86, 143, 187-189 for Melanesian “rubbish 
men”). 
Legal regimes may also impose the N&S rule on certain 
distributions of wealth. However, the N rule makes meritocracy 
possible. In this sense it represents the polar opposite of the S rule, 
which makes it virtually impossible (barring very high levels of 
flexibility or of exclusiveness) to avoid an inclusive nepotism (Ram & 
Holliday, 1993). That the N rule may be the most suited to 
entrepreneurial family firms is suggested by Scheffler’s choices for 
exemplars: the Swat Pathans and the joint families of India and China; 
to anthropologists, these are classically entrepreneurial cases (see 
Barth, 1959: 11, 29; this rule also applies to the maneuverings for 
advantage in Gulliver, 1971: 37, 44, 49, 61). 
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Chinese “Lineage” Based Businesses: An Illustration 
Scheffler’s proposals about filiation are rooted in kinship theory 
and hence are obscure to non-anthropologists.  Therefore, the 
example of Chinese firms, an example that is well recognized, will 
illustrate the concepts. Chinese family “lineages” (zongzu) are the 
prototypical case for illustrating the N mode. As noted, the mode of 
affiliation in itself is not sufficient to generate entrepreneurial uses of 
kinship ties. The Chinese case illustrates the point that we ought not to 
characterize a kinship system, let alone a society, on the basis of its 
system of affiliation (Holy, 1996: 123; Scheffler, 2001: 22; Stewart. 
1998: 21-22). Whereas zongzu organization is rather exclusive, lived 
Chinese kinship is overall rather fluid and inclusive because of 
alternative kinship modes that operate simultaneously.  As noted 
above, Stafford (2000: 38) proposed that “alongside patriliny… and 
alongside affinity… we find two other equally forceful, and relatively 
incorporative, systems of Chinese relatedness.” 
Chinese norms regarding inheritance also facilitate dynamism 
and creativity. Most anthropologists of China have studied peasant 
families whose property is a joint estate or co-parcenary that is 
handed down patrilinealy and “owned by the male descent line as a 
whole” (Greenhalgh, 1994: 756). However, “Chinese customary law 
recognized two kinds of property, the ‘inherited assets’ transmitted 
from the ancestors and the ‘acquired property’” developed by 
entrepreneurs (as above; also Goody, 1997; Wong, 1988: 152-155). 
This latter property was much more attractive to its creators for two 
reasons. Unlike inherited assets, a small number of people (usually a 
father; occasionally two or more brothers) controlled its disposition 
with very few constraints. It was also more socially prestigious. 
Consequently, heirs had a strong incentive to branch off on their own 
and create their own wealth; surely this was a source of vigor in the 
economy if also a source of paternal consternation. 
The zongzu themselves offer many possibilities for exclusion and 
centralization, which is to say they do not meet the “sufficient” 
requirement of the N&S case (and are for this reason not true 
lineages). Chinese “lineages” are essentially “voluntary organizations” 
(Scheffler, 2001: 161; also Freedman, 1958; Greenhalgh, 1994; 
Watson, 1985), in that the potential connections offered by filiation are 
only mobilized in certain cases, in which there are economic and 
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political advantages in doing so. Their modes of exclusion center on 
class, generation and gender differentials in control of the assets of 
the firm (Freedman, 1958: 69, 105, 109-112; Greenhalgh, 1989; 
1994; Scheffler, 2001: Chap.  9; cf. de Lima, 2000).  They are 
exclusive in another sense as well.  In contrast to traditional Mexican 
family firms, which prefer to do business with relatives, Chinese family 
firms have preferred to keep their familial character internal to the 
firm and to trade with non-relatives (Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987: 
144; Menkhoff & Labig, 1996; Wong, 1988: 133, 159-161). (The 
reason for this difference appears to be that the former practice fits 
low trust, high transactions cost environments, and vice versa (see 
Leff, 1978).) 
Proposition 7. Entrepreneurial choice is increased by the 
availability of mechanisms of exclusion. 
7a. This is made more possible to the extent that tactics for 
exclusion are culturally and legally sanctioned. 
7b. This is made more possible to the extent that the N rather 
than N&S or S modes of affiliation apply to incorporation in the 
ownership and management of family firms. 
Limitations and Qualifications 
The effects suggested by some propositions might be non-
monotonic. At some point flexibility diminishes kinship norms.  If 
everyone used all the possible tactics at once very little would be left 
of any kinship system. Similarly, the degree to which kinship norms 
are internalized may be a moderating factor in the relationship 
between kinship discretion and entrepreneurial opportunity. Further, 
some of the propositions are inconsistent with one another. For 
example, it is not possible to maximize opportunities for women and 
also adopt polygyny or concubinage. It is not possible to have both the 
N rule in all respects and required bilateral inheritance. Moreover, 
some of these propositions are logically compatible but in practice are 
seldom found together. The devolution of productive property to 
females, for example, is associated with controls on their marriage and 
courtship; consistent with strategic marriages but not with 
opportunities for discretion by female entrepreneurs (Goody, 1976: 
13-14). Similarly, in any given society some strategies of heirship tend 
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to be used and not others; for example, polygyny is not associated 
with adoption (Goody, 1976: 48-49, 76, 82; Hann, 2008). 
Moreover, it is clear that kinship discretion is but one of many 
factors affecting entrepreneurship.  These have all been ignored for 
present purposes.  But entrepreneurship in the sense of wealth 
creation depends on the wider socio-political context. Mann’s (1984) 
study of brokers in pre-socialist China, whose individually 
entrepreneurial behavior co-existed with a stultifying bureaucracy, is a 
case in point. The actions of Swat Pathan chiefs and of Melanesian 
bigmen are clearly entrepreneurial in a broad sense of the word but 
they are wealth accumulators and not wealth creators. Further, tactics 
that are helpful to individual entrepreneurs might not be associated 
with economic development. As an example, “impartible inheritance 
[which diminishes choices] tended to promote social mobility, more 
efficient agriculture, and the first shoots of industrial development” 
(Hann, 2008: 150). 
We should also be wary of inferring from the use of a tactic that 
an entrepreneur, or anyone else, has used it strategically. There might 
be any number of reasons, legal, demographic, cultural, ecological, 
rather than strategizing, to explain a particular tactic (Viazzo & Lynch, 
2002).  For example, a reason for bilateral inheritance and “women 
[as] residual heirs” might simply be maintenance of a family’s 
“honour” (Goody, 1976: 20). We also need a great deal more 
knowledge of kinship discretion within an economic and venturing 
context before we can develop a satisfactory theory of kinship 
discretion among entrepreneurs. As Wallman (1975) argued, in certain 
contexts kinship is a resource, in others irrelevant, and in others a 
burden. Yet we lack a contingency theory for the three possibilities. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Cross-cultural research  
The propositions in this study might perhaps best be considered 
“speculations,” mere armchair anthropology. They certainly need more 
comparative study and more systematic use of data. Comparisons are 
rendered difficult by the need to consider holistic contexts, history, 
and geographic proximity, as well as the differential attention and 
fieldwork skills reflected in ethnographic reports (Needham, 1971; 
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White, 1988). Such comparisons – Goody’s (1976) work for example - 
are currently somewhat out of fashion (Bloch & Sperber, 2002; Boyer, 
2003; Hann, 2008). Nonetheless, such work is rendered feasible with 
the use of the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) (Ember & Ember, 
2001: 139-143; Hann, 2008; Stewart, 1998: 50-51, 83). Moreover, 
studies using the HRAF continue to be published; a ProQuest® search 
for 1990 to the present finds 452 articles in a wide array of journals 
that cite it. Moreover, HRAF codes include many that cover both 
kinship systems and economic action and lend themselves to testing of 
hypotheses based on the propositions above. Examples of HRAF codes 
are (428) Inheritance; (472) Individual enterprise; (556) Accumulation 
of wealth; (557) Manipulative mobility; (586) Termination of marriage; 
(595) Polygamy; (596) Extended families; (597) Adoption; (608) 
Artificial kin; and (609) Behavior towards non- relatives 
(www.yale.edu/hraf/outline.htm). 
Conflict and the rules of affiliation 
Scheffler (2001: 27, 41) has sketched the relationships between 
conflict – an important concern in family firms - and the rules for 
affiliation. For example, there can be no competition between kinship 
groups over recruitment of their members when filiation is necessary 
(the N&S and N rules), but there can be rivalry for non-kin followers 
and, particularly with the N rule, intense rivalry within the group. The 
illustrative Swats are notorious for the virulence of competition 
between the closest of agnates (so-called blood kin by patrifiliation). 
Amongst them, the route to advancement is indebting increasing 
numbers of agricultural laborers and craftspeople for work on the 
khans’ estates. This requires the control of more agricultural land, 
which in turn leads to rivalry between those who seek to inherit more 
land; that is, between brothers and patrilateral parallel cousins (Barth, 
1959: 45, 68, 108, 112; Scheffler, 2001: 108, 111; see generally 
Fortes, 1969: 237-238 for the “rivalries and latent hostilities that are… 
intrinsically built into [ties such as] close kinship (notoriously 
siblingship)”). We can see in this example the potential for developing 
an anthropology of conflict in kinship systems. Such a project should 
consider the constitutive rules for kin affiliation, the overlay of non-kin 
organization (such as the markets for labor), the manner in which 
entitlements and individual contributions affect attributions of credit 
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and blame, and the political and legal regime, with particular attention 
to systems of inheritance and succession. 
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